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REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MISSION ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 819 (1993)

Letter of transmittal

Letter dated 30 April 1993 from the Security Council Mission established pursuant to resolution 819 (1993) addressed to the President of the Security Council

We, the members of the Security Council Mission established pursuant to resolution 819 (1993), have the honour to submit to you herewith our report in accordance with paragraph 12 of that resolution.

(Signed) Hervé LADSOUS (France)

André ERDOS (Hungary)

Terrence O'BRIEN (New Zealand)

Sher Afgan KHAN (Pakistan)

Vasiliy SIDOROV (Russian Federation)

Diego ARRIA (Venezuela)
(Coordinator)

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* Reissued for technical reasons.

INTRODUCTION

1. At its 3199th meeting, on 16 April 1993, the Security Council adopted unanimously resolution 819 (1993), which reads as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all its subsequent relevant resolutions,

"Taking note that the International Court of Justice in its Order of 8 April 1993 in the case concerning application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)) unanimously indicated as a provisional measure that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should immediately, in pursuance of its undertaking in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948, take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of the crime of genocide,

"Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

"Reaffirming its call on the parties and others concerned to observe immediately the cease-fire throughout the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

"Reaffirming its condemnation of all violations of international humanitarian law, including, in particular, the practice of 'ethnic cleansing',

"Concerned by the pattern of hostilities by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units against towns and villages in eastern Bosnia and in this regard reaffirming that any taking or acquisition of territory by the threat or use of force, including through the practice of 'ethnic cleansing', is unlawful and unacceptable,

"Deeply alarmed at the information provided by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on 16 April 1993 on the rapid deterioration of the situation in Srebrenica and its surrounding areas, as a result of the continued deliberate armed attacks and shelling of the innocent civilian population by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units,

"Strongly condemning the deliberate interdiction by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units of humanitarian assistance convoys,

"Also strongly condemning the actions taken by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units against UNPROFOR, in particular, their refusal to guarantee the safety and freedom of movement of UNPROFOR personnel,

"Aware that a tragic humanitarian emergency has already developed in Srebrenica and its surrounding areas as a direct consequence of the brutal actions of Bosnian Serb paramilitary units, forcing the large-scale displacement of civilians, in particular women, children and the elderly,

"Recalling the provisions of resolution 815 (1993) on the mandate of UNPROFOR and in that context acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

"1. Demands that all parties and others concerned treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a safe area which should be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act;

"2. Demands also to that effect the immediate cessation of armed attacks by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units against Srebrenica and their immediate withdrawal from the areas surrounding Srebrenica;

"3. Demands that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) immediately cease the supply of military arms, equipment and services to the Bosnian Serb paramilitary units in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

"4. Requests the Secretary-General, with a view to monitoring the humanitarian situation in the safe area, to take immediate steps to increase the presence of UNPROFOR in Srebrenica and its surroundings; demands that all parties and others concerned cooperate fully and promptly with UNPROFOR towards that end; and requests the Secretary-General to report urgently thereon to the Security Council;

"5. Reaffirms that any taking or acquisition of territory by the threat or use of force, including through the practice of 'ethnic cleansing', is unlawful and unacceptable;

"6. Condemns and rejects the deliberate actions of the Bosnian Serb party to force the evacuation of the civilian population from Srebrenica and its surrounding areas as well as from other parts of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of its overall abhorrent campaign of 'ethnic cleansing';

"7. Reaffirms its condemnation of all violations of international humanitarian law, in particular the practice of 'ethnic cleansing' and reaffirms that those who commit or order the commission of such acts shall be held individually responsible in respect of such acts;

"8. Demands the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all parts of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular to the civilian population of Srebrenica and its surrounding areas and recalls that such impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance constitute a serious violation of international humanitarian law;

"9. Urges the Secretary-General and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to use all the resources at their disposal within the scope of the relevant resolutions of the Council to reinforce the

existing humanitarian operations in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular Srebrenica and its surroundings;

"10. Further demands that all parties guarantee the safety and full freedom of movement of UNPROFOR and of all other United Nations personnel as well as members of humanitarian organizations;

"11. Further requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with UNHCR and UNPROFOR, to arrange for the safe transfer of the wounded and ill civilians from Srebrenica and its surrounding areas and to urgently report thereon to the Council;

"12. Decides to send, as soon as possible, a mission of members of the Security Council to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to ascertain the situation and report thereon to the Security Council;

"13. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter and to consider further steps to achieve a solution in conformity with relevant resolutions of the Council."

I. MANDATE AND SCOPE OF ACTIVITIES

2. Pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 819 (1993) of 16 April 1993, a mission of the Council was dispatched to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with a view to ascertaining the situation on the ground and reporting thereon. The Mission also visited the cities of Zagreb and Split in Croatia, and Belgrade in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The Mission took place from the evening of 22 April to the morning of 27 April.

3. The actual terms of reference were left to the Mission members to agree upon among themselves. Accordingly, the members decided to meet the leaders of the three parties to the conflict, President Alija Izetbegović of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dr. Radovan Karadžić, the Bosnian Serb leader, and Mr. Mate Boban, leader of the Bosnian Croats. Additionally, the Mission met with the UNPROFOR Force Commander and other commanders, representatives of the UNHCR and ICRC and local authorities of places where hostilities were occurring and inspected such areas as well. The Mission also met Vice-President Ejup Ganić of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and President Franjo Tudjman of the Republic of Croatia.

4. Details of the places visited and the meetings held by the mission are given in annex I to the present report.

II. SITUATION ON THE GROUND

A. Srebrenica

5. The Mission was flown in by United Nations helicopters from the headquarters in Kiseljak via Tuzla and Zvornik while the evacuation of sick and wounded civilians was taking place. No fighting had been reported since 18 April.

6. The killing of civilians by Muslims was viewed by the Serbs as justifying their offensive. The assessment of Lieutenant-General Lars-Eric Wahlgren (UNPROFOR Force Commander) is that it all reflected a chain reaction by all parties. In his view, all sides are committing atrocities at different levels, but only Serbs are taking territory.

7. Srebrenica, which used to be a spa resort, today has a population of approximately 20,000 to 28,000 people, of whom between 8,000 and 10,000 are locals. The rest are displaced persons from surrounding villages that were destroyed by Serbs. The whole enclave today holds 70,000 people.

8. The prevailing conditions of overcrowding, lack of drinking water, which has been cut off, the absence of electricity, sanitation and basic medical assistance represent an extraordinarily dramatic and cruel situation for the people of Srebrenica, many of whom are sleeping in the streets.

9. Streets are being used as toilet facilities. The damage and destruction of more than 50 per cent of the town's houses and public facilities are also creating significant health problems and dangerous sanitary conditions, with the possibility that such a hazardous situation might lead to epidemics, as reported by UNHCR and ICRC.

10. Thousands of people are wandering the streets without any occupation or purposeful activity. Fortunately, food provisions have been arriving by road and airdrops. Although humanitarian aid convoys have not been interrupted, they are subjected to constant harassment at the checkpoint at the entrance to the town and obstacles to free access, contrary to the demand of resolution 819 (1993). The helicopters to evacuate the wounded and the sick are subjected to similar treatment. Thus, the Serbs are determined to show that they are in effective control of the town, that it is at their mercy and that they have not taken Srebrenica only because of the adoption of Security Council resolution 819 (1993). Generals Wahlgren and Morillon stated to the Mission that without such Security Council action the agreement of 18 April 1993 (annex II) between the Bosnian Serbs and the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the demilitarization of Srebrenica would not have been reached.

11. As a precondition to the arrival by helicopter of UNPROFOR and the Mission in Srebrenica, the Serbs demanded that they first land at Zvornik to be checked thoroughly by them. All flights to and from Srebrenica must also land at Zvornik. Furthermore, upon its return from Srebrenica, the Mission was held in Zvornik against its will for half an hour.

12. Before the agreement of 18 April 1993 the town had been under intense shelling; it was surrounded and totally isolated. The situation forced the

local Srebrenica authorities to agree to a settlement by which only the Muslim side was to disarm under the supervision of UNPROFOR. That agreement was subsequently concluded by the Bosnian Commander, General Halilović, at Sarajevo.

13. In Zagreb the Mission learned from General Wahlgren that these negotiations had been initiated at least a month before the Security Council was informed "of the imminent fall of the city and that negotiations were now taking place at the airport of Sarajevo to reach a cease-fire and prevent the slaughter of the population".

14. The Council should note that when it was discussing resolution 819 (1993), it did not know that negotiations involving the Force Commander of UNPROFOR had been taking place and that UNPROFOR had participated actively in the drafting and in the process of convincing the Bosnian Commander to sign the agreement. The alternative could have been a massacre of 25,000 people. It definitely was an extraordinary emergency situation that had prompted UNPROFOR to act.

15. Both the President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina informed us that they had been reminded by the UNPROFOR officers that no outside support would be forthcoming and that they were evidently defenceless. They had to sign the agreement under duress. As noted below, the Mission feels that lessons should be drawn from this experience, both in terms of the need for adequate and opportune information and of the hard choices that may have to be considered.

16. The Srebrenica arrangement cannot be a model but should inspire action by the Security Council to prevent the fall of further enclaves and territories, such as Gorazde, Zepa and Tuzla, which demand immediate action. We know enough today about the conditions prevailing in these towns, notwithstanding Dr. Karadžić's assurance to the Mission that his forces would not attack Gorazde or Tuzla.

17. There is no doubt that had this agreement not been reached, most probably a massacre would have taken place, which justifies the efforts of the UNPROFOR Commander. The population has been saved - obviously under the extreme conditions described above, which will require urgent actions to correct them.

18. Srebrenica is today the equivalent of an open jail in which its people can wander around but are controlled and terrorized by the increasing presence of Serb tanks and other heavy weapons in its immediate surroundings. The UNHCR representative described the town as a "bad refugee camp".

19. During the Mission's briefing at Srebrenica, the representative of ICRC informed it that the Serbs were not allowing surgeons to enter the city, in direct violation of international humanitarian law. There were many wounded requiring surgery. The only surgeon in the city has not been authorized to stay by the Serbs. To impede medical assistance is a crime of genocide. This action, together with the cutting of the water supply and electricity, have put into effect a slow-motion process of genocide.

20. The school where only two weeks ago 15 children were blasted by mortar fire is today a refugee centre for children who, according to the observations of

both the Mission and ICRC, represent a danger as a source of epidemics which might spread and kill the other children of the city as well. Another aspect of the prevailing conditions of the city is that the mutilated remains of the children who were playing soccer when they were killed are still scattered in the area.

21. The sick and the wounded can only be evacuated after a "triage", or examination process, is done by Serbian doctors in conjunction with ICRC, who perform this function at the UNPROFOR helicopter landing area. The Serbian officers who escorted us by helicopter to Srebrenica were also present.

22. The displaced population cannot be relocated to the surrounding areas because the Serb forces are now entrenched there. And even if they wanted to leave, the Serbs are allowing the departure of only the sick, the wounded and dependent women and children.

23. The Mission was also informed by officials of UNHCR that the tents to shelter refugees that they had tried to bring into the city had been confiscated at the Serb checkpoint in Srebrenica because they were considered "military equipment". This represents another impediment to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, in contravention of resolution 819 (1993).

24. Accompanied by the Canadian Battalion Commander, the Mission visited the UNPROFOR observation posts in the mountains surrounding the city. Forty-seven new trenches have been dug by the Serbs in the last week. Tanks and heavy weapons could be seen at a distance of 900 metres from one observation post. Evidently the Serb paramilitary forces not only are not withdrawing as demanded by resolution 819 (1993) but are increasing their pressure on the town.

25. The Serbian colonel in charge of Zvornik, Colonel Rodić, and one of his officers accompanied the Mission during its tour of that town, including the school where the children had been killed by Serb forces. The Mission raised the issue of the surgeon for Srebrenica and Colonel Rodić offered to solve the matter.

26. The Mission identified certain shortcomings in the cease-fire arrangements negotiated at Srebrenica, both in their content and the way they were secured. These include issues relating to the maintenance of basic services and indispensable support services.

27. The short-range perspectives of Srebrenica are the following:

(a) The town is practically under siege, with Serbian forces controlling access to it.

(b) Inhuman conditions prevail, with potentially catastrophic consequences.

(c) Dr. Karadžić indicated to the Mission at its meeting with him at the Belgrade airport that he would not take the town, that the water supply would be immediately restored and that humanitarian convoys would be allowed, "subject to inspection".

(d) Even though Security Council resolution 819 (1993) declared the city a safe area, the actual situation obviously does not correspond to either the spirit or the intent of the resolution.

(e) The Serb forces do not appear to be ready to withdraw. On the contrary, they are today larger than when the resolution was adopted.

(f) The Commander of the Canadian Battalion informed the Mission that the Serbs have "their own interpretation of the demilitarization agreement". The Chief of Staff of UNPROFOR at Kiseljak reported to us that "even though the Security Council is obviously an important organ of the United Nations it is of no importance to the Serbs in the area".

(g) Even five Serbian soldiers were able to detain for 24 hours a humanitarian convoy arriving at Sarajevo, and they subjected the Mission, in the outskirts of the city, to a delay of one and a half hours, during which time a sub-machine gun mounted on a tank was aimed at the vehicle, in which the Coordinator of the Mission was travelling because he had in his possession a camera. The fact that five Serbian soldiers were able to defy a large group of soldiers and officers who were with the Mission should be noted by the Council in order to understand the actual conditions that UNPROFOR faces. The attitude of defiance of the Serbs towards the United Nations in general is a matter that should concern the Council. The Serbs obviously have little respect for UNPROFOR's authority.

(h) The Serb forces must withdraw to points from which they cannot attack, harass or terrorize the town. UNPROFOR should be in a position to determine the related parameters. The Mission believes, as does UNPROFOR, that the actual 4 1/2 by 1/2 kilometres decided as a safe area should be greatly expanded.

(i) The water supply must be resumed. Today this is - if possible - of greater human value and priority than the withdrawal of the Serb forces. Cutting off the water supply is a criminal practice and the Council should demand its immediate cessation. Not to do so would be tantamount to condemning the people of Srebrenica to abject conditions and more human misery.

(j) Not to allow surgeons to enter and stay in Srebrenica is also a grave violation of international humanitarian law. The Serbs should be warned of the implications of such violations. The Council should consider urgent measures in this respect.

(k) The Mission feels that the Security Council should also be kept more fully informed of developments and consulted accordingly - not with a view to "micro-managing" but in order to be in a position to discharge its responsibilities effectively.

(l) The presence of the Council members in Srebrenica was highly appreciated, as evidenced by public manifestations. The Mayor and the authorities expressed a feeling of encouragement by the visit. President Izetbegović said that the visit "represented a symbol of hope for all of his people".

B. Gorazde, Zepa and Tuzla

28. Gorazde and Zepa in particular are today in a situation of great vulnerability. The outcome could be similar to that in Srebrenica if firm actions are not taken immediately. A Security Council resolution to declare them safe areas should be considered without delay in consultation with UNPROFOR.

29. Tuzla is in a different situation, but the displaced persons (200,000) who have moved there are weakening its capacity to resist. The Mission also recommends that it be declared a safe area.

30. UNPROFOR monitors should be deployed around the cease-fire lines, in larger safe areas, but in a way that would not prejudge future implementation of the Vance-Owen plan.

C. Sarajevo - a safe area

31. Sarajevo is one of the oldest cities in Europe and one with a truly ecumenical vocation. It is a symbol of plurality where Serbs, Croats, Jews and Muslims, have coexisted for centuries. This capital of all the peoples of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina should immediately become a safe area. The one-year siege must be terminated. The multicultural character of the city must be guaranteed. It will be a message of hope to the whole country.

D. Vitez

32. The Mission visited the British battalion headquarters at Vitez. It received a briefing by its Commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Stewart, and his staff about the developments in central Bosnia which prompted the statement by the President of the Security Council on 21 April (S/25646) regarding the killings and massacres of Muslim families and the burning of their homes undertaken in complete defiance of the UNPROFOR presence.

33. The Mission was taken to a house in Ahinici where the charred bodies of an entire family could still be seen. They seemed to have been shot and then burned - a tragic event with serious consequences of violent reaction by the Muslims in the area. In fact, three days later Muslims set fire to several houses.

34. The conflict developing in central Bosnia could generate even further atrocities by extremist groups if they are not immediately controlled and stopped.

35. Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart demanded that the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) give a full explanation. In this context the Mission spoke in unequivocal terms with Mr. Mate Boban and with President Tudjman of Croatia. Both were informed of the Security Council's condemnation of these events and the Mission called upon them to act immediately in order to avoid similar recurrences.

36. Mr. Boban, with whom the Mission met at the airport in Split, denied the participation of his forces in these acts, which he said were the acts of radical groups (General Wahlgren had informed us that this group even had swastikas on their clothing).

37. Mr. Boban, while expressing his condemnation of these acts, nevertheless stated that "one must not look only to the effects but to the causes", and that "Croats have been massacred by Muslims". The Mission expressed its deep concern and told him that these developments could seriously tarnish his image and that of the Croats in general, not to mention the repercussions that it could have on the Republic of Croatia.

38. Mr. Boban said he had just returned from Zagreb, where he had met with President Izetbegović and President Tudjman to finalize a new agreement with the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to create a joint command of their armies and to cooperate in putting an end to the conflict between Croats and Muslims (see annex III). They also agreed to move forward on their own towards the implementation of the Vance-Owen plan. This agreement, if implemented, would of course be of considerable significance.

39. Mr. Boban stated that he favoured the creation of an international tribunal to judge acts of atrocities. He also stated that his forces would "shoot" anyone who committed any atrocity.

40. The Mission conveyed to President Tudjman its appreciation for his signature of the agreement, which is seen as a step towards the implementation of the Vance-Owen plan.

41. The Mission also conveyed to him its shock and horror at the killings by Croats of Muslims in central Bosnia and called upon him to help actively in preventing any recurrence of these outrageous incidents and bringing those responsible to immediate justice. President Tudjman agreed that the acts of inhumanity were unpardonable but said that as long as causes existed for provocation, there may be a temptation to resort to such acts of horror which were typical not only of the Bosnian Croats. He promised to use his influence to see that the guilty were punished.

42. President Tudjman also expressed his fears of the expansion of Serbia, which threatened the area of Krajina in Croatia. He said that the Serbs were convinced that the world community would not employ force. It was therefore necessary that pressure be brought to bear upon them. This could be achieved by air strikes on their supplies to Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. He suggested that United Nations peace-keeping forces could also be deployed to monitor any supplies from Serbia. He expressed the belief that Serbia would not be able to defy the whole world.

43. Referring to the problems in UNPAs in Croatia in January 1993, President Tudjman said that the terms agreed to with local Serb authorities had not been honoured and that they had received cross border assistance from Serbia, which had precipitated the crisis. He also stressed that there could be no other solution to the Bosnian conflict but the creation of a confederation with three constituent nations under a United Nations protectorate.

III. OBSERVATIONS

44. In all the circumstances, the UNPROFOR performance in Bosnia is notable. But the question needs to be posed, is the restriction of its role essentially to a supportive humanitarian one, viable in the deteriorating circumstances in Bosnia? Several soldiers in the field expressed deep frustration and anguish to members of the Mission with regard to the restrictions under which they operate. General Wahlgren informed the Mission of his view that "more intensive" peace-keeping by his force in Bosnia should be possible. At the same time he underlined that UNPROFOR resources are heavily stretched and additional tasks would require additional UNPROFOR capability, especially if monitors were to be deployed along the lines of a cease-fire, as suggested by Dr. Karadžić.

45. The Mission believes that the imminent renewal by the Security Council of UNPROFOR's mandate should be the occasion for the Council to address the following issues in detail:

(1) What advantages are there in the Council's declaring the eastern Bosnian towns of Zepa, Gorazde (and perhaps others?) as Security Council safe areas, as an act of preventive diplomacy, before they come under possible direct attack from Serbian forces?

(2) If this action is deemed feasible and desirable, the deployment of UNPROFOR forces with a revised mandate, based on speedy recommendation from the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR's Force Commander, would be urgently required;

(3) At the same time, the actual terms will be required to define Security Council safe areas in each locality in terms of size, the extent of disarmament and demilitarization, the establishment of buffer zones or some other forms of physical separation as well as associated socio-economic factors (covering water and electricity supply) and access to and by humanitarian supplies; the basic role for UNPROFOR under a revised mandate would be to ensure compliance with the terms agreed upon by all parties, including the use of effective monitoring activity;

(4) In the Mission's view, serious attention needs to be given to bestowing a greater reconnaissance capability upon UNPROFOR - even in a situation where no change in its role was envisaged and its essentially humanitarian support role was maintained.

46. The Mission believes that the designation of certain towns/enclaves as Security Council safe areas deserves serious consideration as an act of Security Council preventive diplomacy. But in any resolution to give effect to such designation, it should be clearly and emphatically recorded that the establishment of Security Council safe areas in no way undermines the proposed settlement details of the Vance-Owen plan. It is not an attempt to create new and different internal boundaries within Bosnia.

47. The Mission recognizes that such a decision would require a larger UNPROFOR presence, a revised mandate to encompass cease-fire/safe area monitoring and different rules of engagement; but it would be a step that stops short of the sort of military strike enforcement measures that are now being so openly

debated. It would not rule out eventual consideration of such measures - but at a next stage, if the Serbs simply ignored the integrity of Security Council safe areas; nor would it, on the other hand, automatically predetermine a move to military strikes. Moreover, such a graduated step would not of itself call into question the integrity of the humanitarian aid effort, as would a decision to move immediately to military strikes.

48. The Mission reckons with the fact that these actions would represent a significant strengthening of the UNPROFOR role. Designation of Security Council safe areas would have to be done with the clear intent that they would, once established, be enforced or defended if need be.

IV. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

49. The Mission wishes to put on record its admiration for General Wahlgren, General Morillon and UNPROFOR military and civilian staff for their outstanding performance in discharge of their duties under extremely difficult and demanding conditions which became evident to the members of the Mission during their visit.

50. The Mission was specially impressed by the motivation and dedication of UNHCR staff and also by ICRC representatives in the area, as well as by the level of cooperation and sense of teamwork between those organizations. The Mission was equally impressed by the selfless contributions of the non-governmental organizations in the area.

51. Last but not least, the Mission would like to pay a special tribute to the courageous Canadian Forces in Srebrenica. They have brought hope to the people of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Annex I

Itinerary

23 April 1993

Arrival at Zagreb	Briefing at UNPROFOR headquarters by: Lt.-Gen. Lars-Eric Wahlgren (Force Commander) Lt.-Gen. Philippe Morillon (Commander BH Command) Brigadier Bo Pellnas (Chief Military Observer) Col. Michel Maisonneuve (Chief Operations Officer) Miss Emma Shitaka (UNPROFOR Civil Affairs) Mr. Cedric Thornberry (Chief of Civil Affairs Adm.)

24 April 1993

Arrival at Sarajevo	Meeting with President Izetbegović of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Arrival at Kiseljak	Briefing by: Brigadier G. de V. W. Hayes (Chief of Staff of BH Command in Kiseljak) Mr. José María Mendiluce (Coordinator of United Nations humanitarian assistance in the former Yugoslavia, UNHCR) Mr. Urs Boegli (Coordinator of ICRC operations for the former Yugoslavia)
Arrival at Vitez	Briefing by Lt.-Col. Robert Stewart (Commanding Officer of the British Battalion) and his information officer

25 April 1993

Arrival at Srebrenica	Meeting with: Col. Rodić (Senior representative of the Bosnian Serb Army) Major Mile Popović (Senior representative of the Bosnian Serb Army) Major Zaim Civić (Representative of the Bosnian Army) Major Enver Madzić (Representative of the Bosnian Army)

	Briefing by: Lt.-Col. Thomas K. D. Geburt (Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment) and his deputy Mr. Jean-Claude Amiot (UNHCR) Mr. François Bellon (Head of ICRC Task Force on the former Yugoslavia in Geneva) Mr. José María Mendiluce (Coordinator of United Nations humanitarian assistance in the former Yugoslavia, UNHCR)
Arrival at UNPROFOR observation post	Briefing by Master Corporal Gaudet (2nd Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment)
Arrival at Tuzla	Brief meeting with the Mayor of Tuzla
Arrival at Split	Meeting with Mr. Mate Boban and his military commander
<u>26 April 1993</u>	
Arrival at Belgrade (airport)	Meeting with Dr. Radovan Karadžić and his Assistant, Mr. Sveto Plavsić
Arrival at Zagreb (UNPROFOR headquarters)	Meeting with Gen. Wahlgren, Gen. Morillon and Mr. Thornberry
Airport	Meeting with President Tudjman of the Republic of Croatia and the following: - Dr. Jure Radić, Chief of Staff - Mr. Vladimir Seks, Deputy Prime Minister - Dr. Mate Granić, Deputy Prime Minister - Dr. Zdenko Škrabalo, Foreign Minister - Dr. Branimir Jakšić, Deputy Chief of Staff - Ms. Zdravka Bušić, Adviser - Mr. Zdravko Gavran, Adviser
Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina	Meeting with Vice-President Ganić of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Mr. Mirko Pejanović, Member of the Presidency

Annex II

Agreement for the demilitarization of Srebrenica

At a meeting held at Sarajevo on 17 April 1993, Lt.-Gen. Mladić and Gen. Halilović, in the presence of Lt.-Gen. Wahlgren, representing UNPROFOR, acting as a mediator, agreed the following:

1. A total cease-fire in the Srebrenica area effective from 0159 on 18 April 1993. Freezing all combat actions on the achieved lines of confrontation including supporting artillery and rocket fire.

2. The deployment of a company group of UNPROFOR into Srebrenica by 1100 18 April 1993. This company group is guaranteed safe and unhindered passage from Tuzla to Srebrenica by both sides.

3. The opening of an air corridor between Tuzla and Srebrenica via Zvornik for evacuation of the seriously wounded and seriously ill. The air corridor opens at 1200 18 April 1993 and continues on 19 April 1993, weather permitting, for as long as it takes to evacuate all the existing seriously wounded and seriously ill. The helicopters will fly from Tuzla to Zvornik and land for an inspection at Zvornik which will not cause unnecessary delay to the evacuation. The seriously wounded and seriously ill will be evacuated after identification by UNPROFOR in the presence of two doctors from each side and the ICRC. All categories of seriously wounded and seriously ill will be evacuated by air unhindered by either side. The number of seriously wounded and seriously ill is believed to be approximately 500. This will be verified on 18 April 1993 by UNPROFOR and the result notified to each side.

4. The demilitarization of Srebrenica will be complete within 72 hours of the arrival of the UNPROFOR company in Srebrenica (1100 hours 18 April 1993; if they arrive later this will be changed). All weapons, ammunition, mines, explosives and combat supplies (except medicines) inside Srebrenica will be submitted/ handed over to UNPROFOR under the supervision of three officers from each side with control carried out by UNPROFOR. No armed persons or units except UNPROFOR will remain within the city once the demilitarization process is complete. Responsibility for the demilitarization process remains with UNPROFOR.

5. A working group will be established to decide the details of the demilitarization of Srebrenica. This group will study in particular: the action to be taken if the demilitarization is not complete within 72 hours; the correct treatment for any personnel who hand over/submit their weapons to UNPROFOR. The working group will report to Lt.-Gen. Wahlgren, Lt.-Gen. Ratko Mladić and Gen. Sefer Halilović. The first report will be made at a meeting to be held at Sarajevo airport on Monday, 19 April 1993, at 1200.

6. Both sides are to submit a report on the minefields and explosive obstacles in the Srebrenica area to UNPROFOR. Each side is to clear its minefields under the supervision of UNPROFOR.

7. Neither side is to hinder the freedom of movement. The UNHCR and ICRC are to investigate allegations of hindrance of movement in Srebrenica and Tuzla in particular.

8. Humanitarian aid will continue to be allowed into the city as planned.

9. The officers and the doctors supervising the demilitarization process are under the protection of UNPROFOR; their safety is to be guaranteed by both conflicting sides.

10. The working group is to make recommendations on carrying out an exchange of the prisoners, the killed and the wounded according to the principle "all for all" in the region of Srebrenica within 10 days. This is to be under the control of the ICRC.

11. All the disputed issues are to be resolved by a mixed military working group or at another meeting of the respective delegations of the conflicting sides under the mediation of Lt.-Gen. Wahlgren.

Signed:

Gen. Sefer HALILOVIĆ

Lt.-Gen. Ratko MLADIĆ

Witnessed by:

Lt.-Gen. Lars-Eric WAHLGREN

The 18th day of April 1993

Annex III

Mr. Alija Izetbegović and Mr. Mate Boban, at the meeting convoked in Zagreb on 24 April 1993, by the Co-Chairman of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Lord David Owen, and the President of the Republic of Croatia Dr. Franjo Tud'man, in the presence of Ambassador Peter Hall, Ambassador Herbert Okun, Ambassador Peter Ahrens, Brigadier John Wilson, Brigadier Messervy-Whithing, Mr. Frederick Eckhard, Mr. Ludlow, Mr. Brade, Dr. Jure Radić, Mr. Vladimir Šeks, Mr. Gojko Šušak, Dr. Zdenko Škrabalo, General Janko Bobetko, Ambassador Zdravko Sančević, Dr. Željko Matić, Mr. Ivan Jamjak, Dr. Branimir Jakšić, Brigadier Mile Ćuk, Mr. Ejup Ganić, General Sefer Halilović, Ambassador Bisera Turković, Ambassador Muhamed Šaćirbegović, Mr. Kasim Trnsko and Major-General Milivoj Petković, have issued after the meeting the following .

Joint Statement

1. In accordance with the Agreement between Mr. Alija Izetbegović, Mr. Haris Silajdžić, Mr. Mate Boban and Mr. Mile Akmadžić, concluded on 3 March 1993 in New York, the six members of the coordination body, i.e. Mr. Alija Izetbegović, Mr. Ejup Ganić and Mr. Fikret Abdić, and Mr. Mate Boban, Mr. Mile Akmadžić and Mr. Franjo Boras, will start working within the shortest possible time.

The coordination body will work on the implementation of the Vance-Owen plan to the extent possible, considering the character of the provisions and the present circumstances.

2. In connection with the renewal of the conflicts between the two armies (the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Defence Council) in central Bosnia and some other parts of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which have caused many casualties and serious violations of international humanitarian law, thus posing the threat of far-reaching political consequences, the signatories to this Joint Statement hereby order all military units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) to immediately cease fire and all hostilities in all areas where such military units are in contact.

3. The signatories to this Joint Statement urge all commanders and units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) to unconditionally respect all the thus far concluded agreements between the representatives of the Croatian and Muslim peoples in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In particular, they urge military units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the Croatian Defence Council to immediately start implementing the Agreement on the legality of both the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the HVO, and on the establishment of a joint command of both forces made up of representatives of both headquarters (enclosure).

4. The signatories to the Joint Statement reaffirm that the conflicts between units of the HVO and of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina are contrary to the policy of the representatives of the

two peoples, and that the continuation of such conflicts would seriously jeopardize the achievement of their political goals, i.e. the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the framework of the Vance-Owen plan accepted and signed by the signatories to this Statement, and success in the fight against the aggressor who wants to break the State apart, occupy its territory and annex the occupied territories to "Greater Serbia".

5. The signatories to the Joint Statement condemn most severely all violations of the rules of international humanitarian law regardless of their perpetrators, both sides having been responsible according to data available so far, and undertake to urgently initiate joint and individual inquests concerning each instance of violation of such rights and immediately examine personal responsibility for the conflicts and crimes perpetrated against the civilian population.

The signatories also agree that the facts be established by a special independent international commission.

6. The signatories urge the cessation of mutual accusations leading to a media war.

(The Croatian version shall apply.)

(Signed) Mate BOBAN (Signed) Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ

Witnessed by:

Dr. Franjo TUD'MAN

25 April 1993, 0045 h

Enclosure

Command structure for the BiH Army and the HVO

1. The BiH Army and the HVO will retain their separate identities and command structures. Their functions will include all aspects of personnel, logistics, administration, training, morale and identity.

2. They will form a Joint Command which will be responsible for the operational control of military districts.

3. The Joint Command will consist of the two Commanders-in-Chief, General Halilović and General Petković, who will meet on a regular basis, at least weekly. They will form a permanent joint headquarters to be located at Travnik and consisting of at least three high-calibre officers nominated by each Commander-in-Chief. These officers will work together on a continuous basis to plan and control the operations of all BiH Army and HVO units.

4. The two Commanders-in-Chief will form military districts, under the joint headquarters, whose areas will be related to the operational requirement for joint operations and not to provisional provincial boundaries. Their areas will not overlap. Each military district will have a commander and a deputy appointed by the Joint Command. In each case one will be drawn from the BiH Army and the other from the HVO.

5. Each military district will exercise operational control over all BiH Army and HVO units in its area.

Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ

Mate BOBAN

General Sefer HALILOVIĆ

General Milivoj PETKOVIĆ

Zagreb, 25 April 1993, 0045 h